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The following essay explores the evolution of Italian Communist re-
visionism. In general when we speak of "revisionism" in the Italian Communist
Party (PCI) we usually refer to the question of whether the conquest of power
is possible and of what strategy the Party puts forward in order to achieve
it: the classical questions, in short, which were at the center of the first
great revisionist debate in the Second International. Extensive comparisons
have therefore been made between Italian "revisionism" and its classical
antecedents.
But first a brief review of the PCI's attitude toward the Italian Con-
stitution may be illuminating. At a particularly signi icant moment in its
recent history, the Eighth Congress of December 1956, the PCI approved the
"Elements for a Policy Declaration" which regards the Italian Constitution
that went into effect in January 1948, as an "important victory on the Italian
road to Socialism," and illustrates one fundamental aspect of it in the follow-
ing manner:
As far as private property is concerned, it is guaranteed by law,
'with the aim of safeguarding its social function and making it
accessible to all,' and it is precisely for this reason that the
Constitution lays down limits for it and even provides for expro-
priation, with compensation, for 'reasons of general interest.'
It is not, therefore, unreasonable to state that the Republican
Constitution . . . sets up some of the conditions which may, when
they are put into effect . . . allow some remarkable progress to
be made by the nation's society on the road toward its transforma-
tion in a Socialist direction. 1
1 "Elementi di une Dichiarazione Programmatica" (Elements for a Policy
Declaration), pp. 27-28.
2Now, Article 4l of the Constitution states that "private economic
initiative is free." This fundamental statement is ignored in the PCI's
"policy declaration." Concerning property, Article 42 of the Constitution
lays down: "Private property is recognized and guaranteed by law, which
specifies its means of acquisition and enjoyment, and its limits, with the
aim of safeguarding its social function and making it accessible to all."
As may be seen, this does not say that private property is guaranteed "with
the aim of, etc.," but that it is guaranteed in any case, as a matter of
principle. Once this principle has been laid down, its limits are then
fixed "with the aim of safeguarding its social function and making it ac-
cessible to all" (this last phrase denoting a far from Socialist objective.)
It may seem strange that this essay should begin by pointing out a
legal falsification, that is, the PCI's failure to mention Article 41 and
its distortion of Article 42, in order to portray the Italian Constitution
as a "victory on the Italian road to Socialism." But in fact the PCI's
so-called revisionism consists far more of such subtleties of interpretation
and verbal ambiguities than of serious formulation of doctrine or clear
ideological statements. the PCI's attempts to portray a typically liberal
Constitution as the "initial step on the Italian road to Socialism" have
been based for years on quasi-legal sleights-of-hand; yet when the Constitu-
tion was promulgated, it was described by another important party Congress,
the Sixth, in January 1948, in these terms:
In the first part . . . when there was more democratic enthusiasm,
important new principles were laid down . . . although we did not
succeed in establishing guarantees that they would be carried
out. . . . In the last part . . . such obstacles had been placed
to legislative activity that it would have been almost impossible
to carry out profound structural modifications on the basis of
the Constitution.
It should be noted that the "principles" laid down in the Constitution
were not Socialist, but simply democratic; and that the PCI emphasized that
there were no "guarantees that they would be carried out"; not only this,
but the "obstacles to legislative activity" made "structural modifications"
"almost impossible" (and these, too, would not be in a Socialist direction,
but in a liberal democratic one.)
A written Constitution of this kind, which in 1948 made profound
democratic modifications impossible, was being portrayed a few years later,
around 1953-54, as a text which, if put into effect, would radically trans-
form the Italian State; and by 1956 it had become, and has remained to the
present day, "an important victory on the Italian road to Socialism." The
PCI has never explained what magic transformed the stunted liberal Constitu-
tion of 1948 into the bold pre-Socialist Constitution of 1956; and here we
find another characteristic of the PCI's so-called revisionism, that of
juxtaposing statements made at different periods without any explanation (and
sometimes even statements of the same period: see the Theses for the X
Congress.
2 La politica dei communisti dal quinto al sesto congresso (The Policy
of the Communists from the Fifth to the Sixth Congress) (Rome, 1948), p. 386.
4These characteristics of the PCI's "revisionism" -- that is, ambiguity
in interpretation and persistence of contradictions--are not, however,
accidental; they make up the very essence of a phenomenog which is one of
the most significant features of international communism today.
Whereas Marxist revisionism at the beginning of this century (often
summarized as Bernsteinism) consisted of an explicit theoretical statement
of the need for a re-examination of' some of Marx's hypotheses on the basis
of social and economic evolution during the preceding decades, Communist
revisionism consists of an empirical adaptation to reality, coupled with a
claim to be changing none of the validity of the theoretical principles of
the movement, which are called Marxism-Leninism. In this respect, Communist
revisionism still bears the decisive imprint of Stalinism, which overturned
for opportunist political reasons some of Marx's and Lenin's fundamental
doctrines at the very moment when it was making references to their thought
into a kind of ritual cult, embodying the homage usually reserved for charis-
matic personalities.
Communist revisionism, therefore, does not date from the Twentieth
CPSU Congress in 1956; it goes back more than three decades before, to the
time when the formula, "building Socialism in one country," became an ex-
pression denoting a radical alteration of all the hypotheses about historical
I have talked about "so-called" revisionism, and used the quotation
marks here, to express the same idea; hereafter the term will be used without
any adjective and without quotation marks, as the essay will explain the full
meaning of the word.
5and social development that had guided Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The stages
of this revisionist process are marked by the decay of the Third International,
the tactics of the Popular Fronts (the Seventh Comintern Congress in August
1935), and the "Great Patriotic War" proclaimed by Stalin, thus uniting the
shade of Lenin to those of Nievsky, Suvorov, and Kutusov.
Marxist revisionism at the beginning of the century was imbued with one
fundamental hypothesis, right or wrong as it my have been: namely, that
the situation of the working class in capitalist society, as far as its
standard of living and opportunities for economic and social progress were
concerned, was different from, and better than that which Marx had predicted.
The strategic and tactical suggestions about Social Democracy drawn up by the
revisionists were the result of this assessment of basic principles.
Communist revisionism, however, is not imbued with any fundamental
hypotheses, even though its tactics and strategy, as they are put forward,
for example, by the PCI, present many analogies with typical revisionist
views of the early twentieth century.
But this strategic and tactical viewpoint of the PCI coexists with (and
seems to be profoundly contradictory to) a fundamental assessment of capitalist
society which claims to be the same as that of Marx and Lenin. The new element
in the Communist universe is not an examination of Marxism in the light of the
For this and for other purely political aspects of the PCI's re-
visionism, reference should be made to the arguments used in my "Italian
Communism," in William E. Griffith, ed., Communism in Europe, Vol. 1
(Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 301-383.
6present reality of capitalist society, even one designed to reconfirm the
truth of the doctrine, but the mere statement that Marx's forecast of the
coming of a Socialist society has been a reality for almost half a century,
understanding by "Socialist society" the society achieved in the Soviet
Union, the Chinese People's Republic, and the so-called "People's Democra-
cies" in Europe and Asia, recently joined by Cuba.5
Considered as theory, therefore, the PCI's revisionism consists of a
series of adaptations to particular political situations which the thorough
Marxist training and dialectical skill of the party's ruling class tends to
confer a certain ideological dignity. This training and skill succeed in
making every party document, taken in isolation, more or less acceptable
from a logical point of view. Only a collection and comparison of a series
of texts from the whole twenty-years span of the party's political activity
reveal how the PCI's implicit revisionism is deeply rooted in the party, and
how at the same time it is completely lacking in any theoretical or rational
foundation, on the basis of the principles which the party claims to profess.
It is, of course, well known that within the framework of Marxist
thought itself there are some people who on ideological grounds deny the
Socialist nature of the Soviet Union and the other countries mentioned. These
views are supported in Italy by some traditional currents of opinion, which
regard the Soviet Union as embodying a kind of State capitalism (for example,
the Social Democrats; and also the "internationalist Communists" led by Bordiga,
the first secretary of the PCI in 1921, who publish the fortnightly Il Programma
Communista; or regard it as a "decadent workers' State" (for example, the
Trotskyists of the "revolutionary Communist groups" who publish the monthly
Bandiera Rossa); or regard it as a regime of bureaucratic collectivism (the
most interesting writer of this current is Bruno Rizzi, with whom Trotsky had
a dispute in 1939, and who has recently published The Lesson of Stalinism
[Rome: Opere Nuove, 1962]).
7Although, from the ideological point of view, the PCI's revisionism is
contradictory, ambiguous and inconsistent, from the point of view o political
strategy the party has pursued--despite occasional tactical variations--a
consistent strategy for the whole twenty-year period; this strategic and
political consistency is clearly revealed by its documents, and the PCI's
coexistence with doctrinal ambiguity is expressed succinctly by the following
sentence.
"The Communist Party has declared from the beginning that it does not
regard the Republican Constitution as an expedient for using the instruments
of bourgeois democracy until the time comes for armed insurrection to conquer
the State and transform it into a Socialist State, but as a pact of unity
freely drawn up by the great majority of the Italian people and set up by
them as the basis for the organic development of the nation's life for a
whole period of history." (Theses for the Eighth Congress.)
This statement of principles contains some of the fundamental elements
of the PCI's revisionism:
1. Renunciation, on principle, of armed insurrection and violence as
a means of winning power; this renunciation on principle has been, and still
is, a de facto renunciation, given that this type of policy has been excluded
from the PCI's strategic plans since 1944; this choice reveals the main basic
line of Communist strategy, which is, as has been said, a consistent one.
2. As will be seen, this renunciation changes one of the basic component
doctrines of Marxism-Leninism; therefore, the PCI is forced to justify it
theoretically. The justification comes about on two levels: in the first
place, by allowing for an exception to the general rule, thus depicting
violent action not as a choice by the Communists, but as a subordinate
8alternative which the actions of the class enemies might force the Communists
to use. The document quoted above in fact continues: "Armed insurrection
is an act into which the working class and the people may be forced by open
violation of legality and recourse to violence on the part of the capitalist
ruling classes, in obstinate defense of their privileges and in order to
destroy democracy." Defensive violence is therefore permissible, and there
is even an attempt to portray the Bolshevik coup d'e'tat of October 1917 in
the same way, as an attempt to prevent a coup by Tsarist generals, after a
previous period in which Lenin had supposed a possible "peaceful path" for
the Russian Revolution. In the second place, renunciation of violence on
principle is justified by asserting, as has been seen, that the PCI may
remain within the framework of the Constitution because this by itself
creates the conditions for a peaceful progress toward Socialism.
Since renunciation on principle of armed insurrection--which had been
excluded on the practical level "from the beginning"- -was theorized as a
general precept in 1956, it will be understood why the pre-Socialist charac-
ter of the Constitution was enunciated at the same time: it had to justify
a particular explicit position. Armed insurrection was renounced, in fact,
because the Constitution contained guarantees for the "natural" development
of Socialism. How unfounded this argument is has already been shown.
Nevertheless, whenever the PCI's implicit revisionism becomes explicit,
its similarity to the revisionism of the early years of this century becomes
more obvious. It is enough to refer to an essential point in Lenin's
arguments against the Social Democracy of the Second International, which he
considered permeated by Bernstein's revisionism:
9The doctrine of the class struggle, when applied by Marx to
the question of the State and of the Socialist revolution, leads of
necessity to the recognition of the political rule of the prole-
tariat, of its dictatorship, i.e. of power shared with none and
relying directly upon the armed force of the masses . . . the
necessity of systematically imbuing the masses with this--and
precisely this--idea of violent revolution lies at the root of
all Marx' and Engels' doctrine. The betrayal of Marx' and
Engels' doctrine perpetrated by the social-chauvinist and Kautskian
tendencies dominant today is expressed with particular emphasis by
the oblivion into which the idea of violent revolution is relegated
in the propaganda and agitation of both these tendencies. 6
Ignoring "the necessity of systematically educating the masses in the
idea of violent revolution" "which relies directly on the armed force of
the masses" is, therefore, for Lenin the characteristic feature of the Social-
democratic backsliding of which he accuses the "Social-chauvinists" and the
"Kautskians." And this is so obviously one of the fundamental features of
Leninism that the PCI hesitated a long time before assuming a clear-cut
"State and Revolution," in Selected Works, Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1949),
pp. 142-144 (Italian edition). It is obvious that expressions of this kind
exclude any theorizing by Lenin of the "peaceful road" before the summer
of 1917; and it is significant that this theme has become very important in
the arguments used by the Chinese Communist Party against the PCI, in which
Togliatti has personally been accused of having gone further to the Right
than Kautsky himself.
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position on the question of an armed insurrection, and especially on the
question of renouncing an attempt at armed insurrection when this seemed
theoretically possible (1945-1948).
The importance of this point is derived from three factors:
1. "Violent revolution" is an essential characteristic of Leninism.
2. The Italian situation in 1945-1948 had some remarkable analogies
to the Russian situation in 1917.
3. The PCI had considerable semimilitary strength at its disposal,
deriving from its prominent role in the armed resistance movement against
Nazism and Fascism.
In this situation, renunciation of violent action meant the first,
decisive step on the path of implicit revisionism; but how was this renuncia-
tion justified?
Initially, the official motive was the need to avoid a "Greek perspective,"
that is, civil war with the possibility of Anglo-American intervention while
the anti-German struggle was still on; on the eve of the partisan insurrection
of April 25, 1945 Togliatti denounced to the PCI's National Council "the
tendency that aims at a progressive accentuation of political and class
struggles . . . so as to create disorder and complications . . . this tendency
would impose on Italy what I would call a "Greek perspective," that is,
violent clashes and armed conflict between the organized forces of anti-
Fascism and the forces of the police and the army, led by anti-democratic
elements."7
Quoted by Umberto Terracini, in his essay "La Costituzione Italiana,
la Democrazia e il Socialismo" (The Italian Constitution, Democracy, and
Socialism) in Trent'anni di Vita e Lotta del P.C.I. (Thirty Years of Existence
and Struggle of the PCI) (Rome: Rinascita, 1951), p. 215.
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Some years later Togliatti took up this concept again and amplified
it in a context that claimed to be historical, still referring to 1945:
In this situation it was not easy to choose the right path.
The danger was that we might become deluded by temporary successes
and drive ourselves into a path with no way out, leading inevitably
to a conflict which would break up not only our necessary collabora-
tion with the allied military authorities, but also our unity with
a part of our own population, would compromise the fate of the war,
and would eventually lead to catastrophe. The correct line was to
work so that collaboration with the allied authorities could be
maintained, and so that the broadest, firmest possible democratic
anti-Fascist unity could be created in the country, by organizing
the masses of the people. . . . The greatest positive result of
all this activity was the conquest of the Republican regime. A
different policy to the one put forward and pursued by the Com-
munists, a policy, that is, leading to open conflict with the
Allied authorities and a profound breach in the democratic front,
would have made this victory impossible, as was proved by the
very narrow margin of votes in the plebiscite.8
8 Idem, in the essay "Appunti e Schema per Una Storia del Partito
Communista Italiano" (Notes and Schema for a History of the Italian Communist
Party). The essay was reproduced in Togliatti's Momenti della Storia d'Italia
(Moments in Italian History) (Riuniti, 1963, pp. 156-157), a book which con-
tains passages of history writing dating from the Stalinist period, and which
nevertheless was commended as a praiseworthy historical essay by the judges
of Italy's most important literary prize, the Premio Viareggio (the summer of
1963). It was on this occasion that the main financial backer of the prize,
the industrialist Arrigo Olivetti, who is a member of a Jewish family, inter-
vened to prevent the prize being conferred on Guido Piovene, who is now a
12
At the same time, a document designed for a larger readership summed
up the same situation in these terms:
"The Party knew that the struggle was not an easy one because Italy,
unlike some other countries in Eastern Europe which had been liberated by
the popular forces of the anti-Fascist coalition, was controlled by the rep-
resentatives of the Anglo-American reactionary imperialist forces.
It is no coincidence that whereas Lenin's views on the "violent revo-
lution" were restated in a coherent theoretical work written at the height
of Revolutionary events themselves, the "State and Revolution," the PCI's
renunciation as much in fact as in propaganda and agitation of the idea of
"violent revolution" was not made in any coherent theoretical conceptual way,
contained in one particular work, but by means of individual phrases which
have to be laboriously tracked down here and there in the various Communist
publications that refer to the moments of greatest tension in the class
struggle in Italy. This is, in fact, a further proof of the implicit char-
acter of the PCI's revisionism, a revisionism which is a posteriori with
regard to specific political choices, which permeates all its attempts to
Communist sympathizer but who used to be a Fascist and wrote for the periodical
La Difesa della Razza, the most extreme of all the anti-Semitic journals in
Mussolini's regime. This episode aroused much comment in the Italian cultural
world.
Paolo Robotti and Giovanni Germanetto, Trent' Anni di Lotte dei
Comunisti Italiani (Thirty Years of Struggle by the Italian Communists)
(Rome: Edizioni di Cultura Sociale, 1952), p. 233. Paolo Robotti, who was
an exile in the Soviet Union and was then arrested and tortured under Stalin
(see his speech at the famous meeting of the PCI Central Committee in November
1961) is still, nevertheless, regarded as being hostile to Khrushchev's "new
course."
generalize its judgments, but which is never expressed in a precise, coherent
text or series of texts.
At the end of the twenty-year period Togliatti returned to the same
theme: at the Tenth Congress (December 1962) he affirmed that renunciation
of an armed rising in 1945-1948 was a voluntary choice made after an independ-
ent assessment of the situation by the PCI, quite independently of the presence
of Anglo-American armies, and he took up this theme once more at a lecture on
the history of the PCI, given at one of the leading Italian Universities,
the Scuola Normale Superiore at Pisa:
There was complete and utter silence when Togliatti answered
the question which agitated the meeting: Why did we go no further?
The Partisans' command of units were in our hands; could we there-
fore have used this force--as some people said--to seize power and
achieve our objectives? Togliatti replied that in Italy at that
period, occupied by foreign armies, armed struggle would have been
a reckless adventure involving much bloodshed. However, this is
not the fundamental reason why we did not go any further. The
fundamental reason is that the great problems of the nation were
not mature in the minds of the great masses of the people. It
therefore seemed to us to be indispensable to draw up a program
of development for Italian democracy, embodying it in institutions.
Hence the Constitution, which is not an expedient, but a pact of
unity freely signed by the majority of the Italian people.10
The immaturity of the "great masses of the people" is, therefore, "the
fundamental reason" for "not having gone any further" in attempting the seizure
10 L'Unith., March 5, 1964.
l4
of power. Yet in 1946 Togliatti described the level of maturity of the
"masses" in Northern Italy in these terms:
It has come about . . that in the course of the war of
liberation the masses who took part in the struggle, and who
formed the most militant section of the Italian people, suc-
ceeded in setting themselves very advanced objectives which
could not, however, become the objectives of the whole people
after the Liberation, because of the conditions in which the
political struggle was being waged in the rest of Italy and
in the rest of Europe. 1 1
Once again, the ambiguity of the implicitly, revisionist language used
requires an exegesis that is far from easy. Compared with typically Leninist
positions (a comparison which is made difficult by the fact that these texts
talk about "popular masses" and not about "working class") the fundamental
theoretical position of the PCI may be interpreted thus: in 1945 the "masses
who made up the most militant section of the Italian people" (that is, the
industrial proletariat of Northern Italy) had succeeded in setting themselves
"very advanced objectives," that is, they aimed at "seizing power and achieving
our objectives" with the armed force of the "Partisan commando units." But
the PCI restricted itself to less advanced objectives (the Republic and the
Constitution) because the masses in the "rest of Italy" (that is, the South)
were more backward (it may be noted that this distinction, which had been made
in 1946-1947, disappeared in 1964 when the concept of immaturity was extended
to all the "great masses of the people.")
11
La politica dei communisti dal quinto al sesto 4ongresso, pp. 79-80.
15
The Leninist concept of the working class" avant-garde which, under the
guidance of the Party, draws the more backward masses (workers and peasants)
toward the conquest of power by means of armed insurrection is here literally
stood on its head. The working class avant-garde, inspired by the Party, in
fact restricts itself to less advanced objectives, renounces armed insurrec-
tion, and waits for the process of maturity to run its course among the most
backward classes--and this not through the aggravation of class struggle,
but within the framework of parliamentary institutions.
The Leninist theory according to which it is the aggravation of the
class struggle, leading to violent action for the seizure of power, and not
any process of institutionalizing a "peaceful" struggle in a representative
democracy, that fulfills the process whereby the working class avant-garde
organized by the Party puts itself at the head of the backward masses, was
put into practice in 1917, when Lenin aimed at seizing power the moment he
was guaranteed the support of the decisive elements in the working class and
the poor peasantry. Lenin certainly never put forward the immaturity of the
immense illiterate peasant masses as an argument for limiting the objectives
of the struggle to merely setting up a democratic Republic (although this was
the position of the Mensheviks). And nobody can seriously maintain, on the
basis of any criteria Leninism might adopt to measure the maturity of the
masses, that the masses of the Italian people in 1945-1946 were more backward
than the Russian masses in 1917. This is so obvious that, as has been seen,
this thesis has been fully developed by the PCI only after a period of twenty
years from the events themselves, because it could not have been maintained
during the actual situation of 1945-1946.
16
Thus the PCI goes from contingent reasons (the need to avoid clashes
with the army and the police while the war against the Germans was still
being fought; and the presence in Italy of Anglo-American troops, "unlike
several countries of Eastern Europe") to reasons of a more general nature,
such as the backwardness of a section of the population (peasants, especially
in the South), and finally ends up with the general thesis of the "immaturity
of the great masses of the people," which makes it "indispensable" to limit
the PCI's perspective to that of a Constitution of the liberal type.
The intermediate stage outlined by the PCI in the first ten years
after the war was, therefore, that of promoting the evolution of the backward
South in order to bring it up to the level of the Center and the North and
achieve a political homogeneity under Communist leadership in the country,
which would then enable more advanced objectives to be set. Reference to
the Leninist theoretical model was continued, by speaking of the democratic
bourgeois revolution in the same way that the Bolsheviks had spoken of the
events of 1905 and February 1917, this latter being destined to flow very
rapidly into the "Socialist Revolution" of October. Thus the Fifth Congress
at the end of 1945, in discussing the problem of the struggle for the Con-
stituent Assembly, the problem of great structural reforms and the problem
of defending national unity, discussed problems whose solution might lead to
the completion of the democratic bourgeois revolution in Italy, and the first
steps toward more advanced forms of democracy. At the Congress Palmiro
Togliatti declared: "There is taking place in Italy the democratic revolu-
tion that has never been brought to a proper conclusion in our country,
17
which began in the nineteenth century and has made further strides forward,
but has never succeeded in triunphing! "l2
In reality, Communist penetration in the South (which is without
doubt one of the main characteristics of Italian evolution during the last
twenty years, especially on the electoral level) took place when the objec-
tive conditions of the country were very different from those existing in
1945-1948. In the meantime the fundamental choice of the earlier period
had been put into a new context, on the one hand by extending the earlier
"immaturity" to the whole "mass of the people," and on the other by regard-
ing the objective of a Constitutional Charter containing the premises for
the first steps on the road to Socialism as already achieved.
The great importance, both theoretical and political, of the decisive
choice made by the PCI in 1945-1948 when it renounced the use of force in
the seizure of power, is therefore evident. In fact, we can say that:
1. The motives put forward were an implicit revision of Lenin's thought;
but even more important is the fact that the consequences of this policy al-
lowed the rebuilding of Italian society on largely traditional foundations,
thus creating social and economic conditions which were to have an increas-
ing influence on the very structure of the PCI from the point of view of its
social composition, the attitude of its militants, and the role of its ruling
class.
2. These very conditions, and the PCI's assessment of them, also
implied in their turn a growing separation from the Leninist analysis, and an
12 Trent'Anni di Lotte, p. 233.
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acceptance--still implicit but constantly increasing--of theoretical assess-
ments similar to those of the Social Denocratic "revisionists."
The fundamental components of Italian Communist revisionism were there-
fore created in the final phase of World War II and immediately afterward;
and on this revisionism is based renunciation of the fundamental principle
of the use of violence for the seizure of power and for the setting up of
the dictatorship of the proletariat, which was the fundamental reassessment
made by Lenin and the Bolsheviks to the revolutionary interpretation of
Marxism, when they were faced with what they considered the reformist dis-
tortions of the Second International, permeated with revisionism.
Moreover, even as early as the last decade of the nineteenth century,
the process of gradualist evolution of Social Democracy had begun as a
theoretical development of the same type.
In 1891 Social Democracy took up a new program known as the Erfurt
Program, modifying the famous Gotha program of 1875 which had been the
subject of Marx's well known criticism. One of the most acute Italian
scholars of that period, Saverio Merlino, who played an important part in
the revisionist arguments at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the
twentieth centuries, took the opportunity to make a series of critical judg-
ments that deserves to be reproduced. It is worth recalling that an article
by Bernstein entitled "Blanquism and Socialism," written for the Neue Zeit
but which that journal refused to print, appeared in the April and May 1899
issues of the review founded by Merlino, Rivista Critica del Socialismo.
Merlino was an anti-authoritarian Socialist, a critic of the Marxist conception
19
as a whole, and it was partly for that reason that Bernstein refused to con-
13
tinue his contributions to the review. But the clear-sightedness with
which Merlino saw the origins of the evolution of German Social Democracy
which were later to give rise to revisionism makes him perfectly suited to
our argument.
Examining the Erfurt program and criticizing the delay with which the
German Social Democrat leaders had published Marx's criticisms of the previous
Gotha program, Merlino wrote in 1891:
The word invented by the German Social Democrats, Volks-
Staat (People's State) is nonsense; is absolutely meaningless.
It does not indicate what the nature or structure of such a
State will be, whether it will be centralized or decentralized,
and in the latter case to what extent; . . . finally it tells
us nothing about the intentions of those who use this word
with its "dark color."
Marx remarked on this quite correctly in 1875; yet nevertheless the German
Socialists have continued to use this word, and to portray it as the non
plus ultra of 'scientific' radicalism. This is another reason why Marx's
criticism could not be published. The German Socialists have now found
another subterfuge on this issue; they have declared that there is no need
13
The episode is described in Concezione Critica del Socialismo
Libertario (Critical Ideas on Free Socialism) (Florence: ed. la Nuova
Italia, 1957), p. 273ff. This book is an anthology of Merlino's writings,
and the author appears from it to have been one of the most significant
figures in the debate on Socialism at the turn of the century.
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to concern themselves with the future because it is impossible to tell
exactly how things will turn out. They have discovered a similar subterfuge
on this issue; they have declared that there is no need to concern themselves
with the future because it is impossible to tell exactly how things will turn
out. They have discovered a similar subterfuge with regard to the 'revolu-
tionary dictatorship,' and they refuse to declare themselves either for or
against it nowadays, because they say that everything depends on the wisdom
or folly of the bourgeoisie's behavior when faced with the proletariat's
demands. Obviously these maneuvers reveal a higher degree of ability than
of strong conviction or sincerity.1 4
Here Merlino has grasped the beginning of an implicit revisionism in
the attitude of German Social Democracy, a starting point similar to that
of the PCI. Unlike the PCI's revisionism, however, German implicit revision-
ism was to turn into explicit revisionism a few years later.
We can see the analogies between the two situations especially on the
ideological level, the essential point being renunciation of the twin con-
cepts of revolutionary (armed) action and of the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat. These twin concepts (the second being the immediate consequence of
the first) cease to be the historical perspective of the party, or a des-
cription of the characteristic features that will necessarily distinguish
the phase of transition from capitalism to Socialism, and become a mere
possibility which may or may not be carried out--this depending not on the
14 Ibid., p. 56-57. The reference is to an article published by
Merlino in the April and May 1891 issues of the review La Societe Nouvelle.
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will of the proletariat, but on the attitude of the bourgeoisie. There is
an obvious analogy between the "wisdom or folly of the bourgeoisie's be-
havior" (in Merlino's apposite phrase) and the PCI's statement, already
quoted, according to which "armed insurrection is an act into which the
working class and the people may be forced by open violation of legality
and recourse to violence on the part of the capitalist ruling classes."
Armed action, then, becomes a subordinate path, a secondary hypothesis,
compared with the fundamental strategic perspective of the working class
movement, that is, the legal seizure of power within the framework of the
legal State institutions of capitalist society. The theoretical point of
reference for this perspective can be traced back to the last important
work of Engels, his preface to Marx's work The Class Struggles in France
from 1848 to 1850. This preface was written in 1895 and it is necessary to
quote it fully:
The German workers had . . provided their comrades in
every country with a new weapon, a very sharp one, by showing
them how universal suffrage could be used . . , the successes
obtained by the exercise of universal suffrage revealed to the
proletariat a new method of struggle, and this method quickly
developed further. It was found that the institutions of the
State, in which the rule of the bourgeoisie is organized, offer
the working class still greater opportunities to fight these
very institutions. The workers took part in elections to local
Diets, to municipal councils and industrial tribunals; they
competed with the bourgeoisie for every post in which a suf-
ficient number of workers had a vote. And so it happened that
the bourgeoisie and the government came to be much more afraid
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of the legal action of the workers' party than of its illegal
activities, more afraid of the results of elections than of
rebellions. For here, too, the conditions of the struggle
had undergone an essential change. Rebellion in the old style,
street fighting with barricades, which decided the issue every-
where until 1848, had become to a considerable extent obsolete.
* . . Since that time there have been many more changes, and
all of them in favor of the military. . . . Does the reader
now understand why the ruling classes actually want to get
us out to where the guns fire and the sabres flash? . . .
The time of surprise attacks, of revolutions carried through
by small conscious minorities at the head of unconscious
masses, is past. Where it is a question of the complete
transformation of the social organization, it is essential
to have the masses' active participation, it is essential
that the masses should themselves have grasped what is at
stake and what they are fighting for. This is what the
history of the last fifty years has taught us. But in order
that the masses may understand what is to be done, long per-
sistent work is required, and it is just this work that we
are now pursuing with a success that drives our opponents to
despair. Even in the Latin countries it is beginning to be
realized that the old tactics must be revised. Everywhere
the German example of using the suffrage, of winning all
posts that are within our grasp, has been imitated . . .
even in France it has come to be realized that slow propaganda
work and parliamentary activity are the immediate tasks of the
party . . . in Belgium last year the workers won the right to
vote and were victorious in a quarter of the constituencies.
In Switzerland, Italy, Denmark, yes even in Rumania and Bul-
garia, the Socialists are represented in parliament . . . of
course, our foreign comrades do not thereby in the least re-
nounce their right to revolution. The right to revolution is,
after all, the only really "historical right." . . . But
whatever may happen in other countries, the German Social
Democrats have a special position and consequently, at
least at present, a special task. The two million voters
that they attract to the ballot box, together with the
young men and women who support them as nonvoters, form
the most numerous and most compact mass, the decisive
shock force of the international proletarian army. This
mass already supplies over a quarter of the total votes
cast; and as the recent by-elections show . . . it is con-
tinually increasing. Its growth proceeds as spontaneously,
as steadily, and as irresistibly, and at the same time as
tranquilly, as a natural process. All government inter-
vention has proved powerless against it. We can count
even today on two and a quarter million voters. If we
continue in this way, by the end of the century we shall
have conquered the majority of the middle strata of society,
the petty bourgeoisie and even the small landowners in the
countryside, and we will have grown into the decisive power
in the country, before which all other powers will have to
bow whether they like it or not. To keep this growth in-
creasing steadily without interruption, until it overwhelms
the present regime by itself . . . this is our main task.
And there is only one means by which the steady rise of the
Socialist fighting forces in Germany could be temporarily
halted, or even thrown back for some time: a large-scale
conflict with the army, a blood letting like the one in
Paris in 1871. In the long run even that would also be
overcome. To shoot a party which numbers millions of ad-
herents out of existence is too much even for all the maga-
zine rifles of Europe and America together. But the normal
evolution would be impeded, the shock force would perhaps
not be available at the critical moment, the decisive combat
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would be delayed, protracted, and attended by heavier sac-
rifices.15
This passage is so clear that comment is superfluous, and there is no
doubt that it supports the interpretation of those who trace the implicit
revisionism that began to permeate German (and later European) Social
Democracy even before it became explicit, back to these views expressed by
Marx's closest and most faithful colleague. Even though Engels reaffirms
the "right to revolution," the passage as a whole certainly can not be re-
garded as "propaganda and agitation for the idea of violent revolution,"
to repeat Lenin's expression quoted above.
The perspective of a "tranquil proces-s like a natural process" is
based, however, on the possibility of the working class winning "preponderant
power" within the framework of the bourgeois State by means of a continual
expansion of its electoral influence. This is also an expression of growing
maturity and awareness among the masses, to achieve which "a long period of
hard work is necessary." The bourgeoisie can resist and react against this
process only with the use of violence, by calling in the army, thus causing
"a blood letting like in Paris in 1871."
15 Engels' text is quoted from the edition published by Critica Sociale
in 1896, p. 13-20. Critica Sociale, founded in 1891 by a group led by Filippo
Turati, was the first Socialist review in Italy, established a year before
the Socialist Party itself. It was the mouthpiece of the gradualist wing of
Marxism, which ruled the Socialist Party in its early years at the end of the
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, when the party was de-
cisively influenced by the views expressed in this passage by Engels.
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Hence, action within the framework of legality is proposed, considering
as a premise for So ialism the setting up of a "People's State" (the German
Social Democrats at the end of the nineteenth century)16 or the implementation
of the Italian Constitution (the PCI today); in both cases there is no talk
of "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the transition period between capi-
talism and Socialism, just as the related concept of the necessity of violent
action, or of armed insurrection, is also abandoned as a principle.
This institutional analogy between the old type of German Social
Democracy and the PCI is coupled with a historical analogy expressed in a
legal document: the end of anti-Socialist legislation in Imperial Germany,
and the promulgation of the Republican Constitution in postwar Italy. Here
is Engels' assessment of the first of these:
Thanks to the intelligent use which the German workers made
of the universal suffrage introduced in 1866, the astonishing
growth of the Party was made plain to everybody by indisputable
statistics: 1871, 102,000; 1874, 352,000; 1877, 493,000 Social
Democratic votes. Then came recognition of this progress by
higher authority, in the shape of the anti-Socialist law; the
Party was temporarily broken up, and the number of votes dropped
to 312,000 in 1881. But that was quickly overcome, and then
16 It is significant, in showing the recurrence of the same concepts,
expressions and arguments in Marxist revisionism either of the implicit or
explicit kind, that the phrase "People's State," as opposed to the dictator-
ship of the proletariat, was resuscitated by Khrushchev at the Twenty-second
CPSU Congress; this aroused bitter criticism from the Chinese Communist
Party.
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rapid expansion really began--under the pressure of the Excep-
tional Law, without a Press, without a legal organization, and
without the right of association and assembly: 1884, 550,000;
1887, 763,000; 1890, 1,427,000 votes. Thereupon the hand of the
State was paralyzed. The anti-Socialist law disappeared; Social-
ist votes rose to 1,787,000, over a quarter of all the votes
cast. The government and the ruling class had exhausted all
their expedients, uselessly, purposelessly, and unsuccessfully.
The tangible proofs of their impotence, which the authorities,
from night watchman to Imperial Chancellor, had had to accept--
and that from the despised workers!--these proofs were counted
in millions. The State has come to the end of its tether,
whereas the workers have hardly begun theirs.1
There is described here a historical process divided into three periods:
first, Socialist expansion; second, special legislation by the government,
which proves useless; third, resumption of Socialist expansion under the pro-
tection of bourgeois laws.
Let us now compare this passage with a similar one, taken from the
afore-mentioned "program" of the PCI at the Eighth Congress:
The Italian Communist Party arose in 1921 at a time of
grave international and national crisis, at a time of very
great crisis for the workers' movement in our country . . .
the first task that had to be faced and resolved [by the
PCI] was that of making the working class regain its inde-
pendence and political autonomy in opposition to the ruling
17 Engels' preface to The Class Struggles in France from 1848 to 1850,
op. cit., p. 13.
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classes gathered round the Fascists, and to make it take the
initiative in the reconquest of democratic liberties. . . .
The Fascist dictatorship provides proof that the capitalist
regime, now that it has reached the era of great monopolies
and imperialism, contains within itself the germs of violent
destruction of political liberties. . . . Liberation from
Fascism and from foreign occupation was the work of a great
national popular movement. In the course of a great revolu-
tionary patriotic movement, the working class became conscious
of its national role, formed a more concrete kind of Socialist
awareness, carried forward the process of its own internal
unification, and gathered round itself a very broad alignment
of workers, intellectuals, and members of the middle class.
Hence at the fall of Fascism there was a generally felt demand,
not for a restoration of a parliamentary democratic regime of
the old type, but for a new society and a new State; . . . as
the expression of this vast movement of renovation, the Repub-
lican Constitution . . . is an important victory on the Italian
path to Socialism.
Here, too, a historical process divided into three periods is described:
first, Socialist expansion; second, destruction of political liberties by
Fascism; third, resumption of Socialist expansion under the protection of
the bourgeois laws. In historical situations that obviously contain many
elements of difference (which are reflected in partial differences of judg-
ment) the historical and logical schema of Engels and that of the rulers of
the PCI is analogous, and may be summarized in the conclusion that the
(bourgeois) State has "come to the end of its tether, whereas the workers
have hardly begun theirs." There is a legal and institutional framework,
the culmination of a historical process, within which the Socialist movement
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can make peaceful progress, and the use of violence is henceforth merely a
weapon in reserve, which may be needed to face up to a last desperate attempt
by the bourgeoisie to oppose the inevitable hegemony of the working class.
Engels' analysis--the premise for the German Social Democrats' open
revisionism, the further developments of which will be analyzed later--was
modified by Lenin with this preemptory judgment:
Constitutional legality was maintained in Germany for
almost half a century (1871-1914), for a surprisingly long
period, and to a surprising extent; during this time the
Social Democrats were much more successful than in other
countries in making full use of their legal status and
organizing a much larger section of the workers into a
political party than in any other country in the world.
What is this section, therefore? . . . . A million members
of the Social Democratic party out of fifteen million wage
earning workers. 18
After disparaging in this way the results of the activity that Engels
made the basis of his whole perspective, namely, the process of growing
maturity in the masses as a result of the work of the Social Democrats, Lenin
went on to express this drastic judgment in direct argument against Kautsky:
The more highly developed democracy becomes, the more
chances there are of 'pogroms' and civil war arising out of
any deep political conflict that threatens the bourgeoisie.
. . . Are we to suppose that the learned Kautsky has never
heard the fact that as democracy becomes more highly developed,
18 Lenin, "State and Revolution," op. cit., p. 185.
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the more do bourgeois parliaments fall under the control of
the Stock Exchange and the bankers? 9
There is no need to produce other quotations to show that Engels in
1895 and Lenin in 1917 gave very different assessments of bourgeois democracy
and the role that the working class and the Socialist movement can play
within it. Lenin, beginning his analysis at the same point Engels had
started from (the introduction of universal suffrage by Bismarck so as to
obtain a certain degree of popular consensus for the process of founding
the German Empire) carried it through to 1914, depicting the whole period as
one of "constitutional legality" and regarding the period of the exceptional
anti-Socialist laws as an unimportant parenthesis. He maintained that the
fate of German Social Democracy in that period confirmed his general assess-
ment, according to which the capitalist bourgeoisie exercised closer control
over parliament and the institutions of the State, as democracy (whether known
as "bourgeois" or "representative" democracy) became more widespread.
To understand the root cause of this difference in judgment, we must
go back to considering the nature of German Social Democracy in 1914 as com-
pared to 1895. In fact, it had not used "the institutions of the State, in
which the rule of the bourgeoisie is organized, . . . to fight these very
institutions," as Engels has put it; on the contrary; it had increasingly
come to feel that it had a share in these institutions. The State and capi-
talist society had not halted the expansion of Social Democracy with the one
19 "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," in Selected
Works (Italian edition), op. cit., p. 353-
means that Engels thought they might be able to use ("large-scale conflict
with the army"), but by bringing the Social Democrats into the system of in-
stitutions to such an extent that their representatives themselves voted war
credits for the army on August 4, 1914.
Analysis of how it was possible for the workers' and Socialist movement
to be integrated into capitalist society at the turn of the century leads
to the conclusion that the phenomenon was not only political (a relationship
between the working class and the institutions of the State) but also social;
that is, it concerns the evolution of the proletariat itself within the frame-
work of society, both as it happened in reality and as it had been predicted
by Marx. At this point the leading theorist of revisionism, Bernstein, sur-
mised that some of Marx's hypotheses ought to be "revised," that is, corrected.
In the statement of this proposition, and in the critical attitude thus
adopted toward the theories of the founder of "scientific Socialism," lies
the essence of the revisionism of the PCI--a revisionism which does not admit
this proposition and has not adopted this kind of attitude.
In a letter sent to the Stuttgart Congress of the German Social Democrats,
in 1898, Bernstein wrote:
I have been opposed to spreading the idea that the collapse
of bourgeois society was imminent, that Social Democrats should
base their tactics on the idea of this great imminent catastrophe
and subordinate their policies to this concept. I still hold to
this belief. The partisans of the catastrophic theory invoke
the Communist Manifesto in support of their thesis, but they
are wrong to do so in every way. The hypothesis about the evo-
lution of modern society expounded in the 'Communist ManifestoI
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was correct as far as the general tendencies of this evolution
were concerned. But it was mistaken concerning detailed judg-
ments, and especially concerning its estimate of the time nec-
essary for this evolution. This error was clearly admitted by
Engels, the co-author of the 'Manifestot in his Preface to the
Class Struggles in France. It is obvious that since economic
evolution has required a longer time than was initially thought,
it also had take on forms and lead to situations that were not
foreseen, and could not have been foreseen, at the time when
the 1Manifestol was drawn up. The worsening of the economic
situation, according to the forecasts of the tManifesto) has
just not happened. It is not only useless but idiotic to hide
this fact. The number of property owners has not diminished,
but increased. The enormous growth of social wealth has not
been accompanied by a decline in the number of capitalist mag-
nates, but on the contrary, by an increase in the number of
capitalists of every type. The middle classes are changing
their characteristics, but are not disappearing from the
social scene.20
These words contain all the "revisionist" views put forward by Bernstein,
and may be summarized in the following two propositions:
1. Evolution of society is taking place at a slower rate than predicted
by the "Manifesto" and by Marxist hypotheses in general.
20 Reproduced in Paul Louis, Cent Cinquante Ans de Pensee Socialiste
(Paris: Ed. Rivibre, 1953), p. 49-50. The letter was reproduced by Bernstein
in the preface to his book Theoretical Socialism and Practical Social-
Democracy (Paris: Stock, 1900).
2. In the course of this "long period" social stratification cannot be
reduced to the division between capitalists (whose number is declining) and
proletarians (whose number is increasing).
It is this twin aspect of the phenomenon--in itself undeniable, even
if the statistics on which Bernstein based his theories are open to discussion--
which revisionism made the basis of its political strategy. And it is this
same twin aspect that allows us to understand how the workers' and Socialist
movement came to be integrated into society, instead of taking up a purely
antagonistic attitude to it (which Bernstein only partly understood).
The link between these assessments, the process of growing maturity
in the proletariat and the methods by which power is to be seized and exercised
(dictatorship of the proletariat and revolutionary violence), which we have
mentioned above, can be grasped by analyzing the following judgments made by
Bernstein, in which it may also be noted how he continues to regard Marx's
chief colleague as a supporter of the classical Marxist position on the dic-
tatorship of the proletariat despite his views on Engels' Preface quoted
above:
It is well known how Marx and Engels for a long time con-
sidered recourse to revolutionary violence as inevitable almost
everywehre, and how a certain number of faithful adherents to
Marxist doctrine still do. Many, too, regard it as the quickest
method. A big contribution to this notion is made by the idea
that the working class is the most numerous class and at the
same time the most energetic one, since it is without property.
Once in possession of power, it will not stop until it has
changed the foundations of the existing system by setting up
institutions that will make it impossible to go back to the
old ways. It has already been shown that Marx and Engels,
when they were formulating their theory on the dictatorship
of the proletariat, took as their typical example the period
of the Terror in the French Revolution. In Anti-Dahring
Engels call Saint-Simon's definition of the Terror as the
dictatorship of the propertyless crowd--a definition made
in 1802--a stroke of genius. This assessment is to some
extent exaggerated, but whatever may be thought of the
definition, the results of the dictatorship of the property-
less crowd were favored by Saint-Simon no more than by the
shopkeeper, Schiller. The 'propertyless' in 1793 were only
capable of fighting the same battles over and over again,
they could reign only as long as the Terror lasted, and
when it ended, as it inevitably did, their reign completely
vanished. According to the Marxist-Engelsian conception,
this danger does not exist as far as the modern proletariat
is concerned. But what, then, is the modern proletariat?
If by this term is meant all those who do not derive any
income from property or from a position of privilege, then
these people obviously make up an absolute majority of the
population in the advanced countries. But in this case,
this 'proletariat' is made up of a very large number of
extraordinarily heterogeneous elements and classes which
are far more different from each other than was the 'people'
in 1793; and while the present conditions of property owner-
ship last, this crowd may have a greater number of common
interests--or at least similar interests--than of conflicting
interests. Nevertheless, after the present property owners
and rulers have been expropriated or desposed, it will soon
be realized just how different the needs and interests of the
various component sections are.21
21 Ibid., Chapter 4, "The Mission of Social-Democracy and How to Fulfill
It," pp. 51-52.
We may recognize in this undifferentiated "proletariat" ("all those
who do not derive any income from property or from a position of privilege")
the "crowd" that--under the leadership of the true working class--Lenin and
the Bolsheviks led during the October Revolution, and whose needs and inter-
ests proved to be so different in the course of later developments during
the revolution itself. This method of regarding the relations between the
political party and the mass of the nonprivileged classes is, in fact, another
of the fundamental differences between revisionism and Leninism: the former
emphasizes that "the common interests" deriving from "the present conditions
of property ownership" are not sufficient to transform the masses into con-
scious builders of a Socialist society, in the first phase of which will
emerge "different needs and interests" among the various groups; the latter
considers it more important that the "common interests" of the masses should
be sufficient to make them into shock troops in order to "depose and expro-
priate the present rulers and property owners." In the first case, the
Party is understood as being a trainer, almost a teacher; in the second,
as a chosen unit whose example may guide the struggle even of those who do
not fully understand its aims.
As far as the true, proper working class is concerned--as opposed to
the undifferentiated "crowd"--Bernstein's position is similar:
Despite the considerable progress that the working class
has made from the intellectual, political, and economic point
of view since the days when Marx and Engels were writing, I
do not regard it as sufficiently evolved as yet to take political
power into its own hands. I think it is my duty to say this only,
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all the moIe so as a stereotype model is put forward in the
working class and this is threatening to make any kind of
calm judgment impossible; I know that my remarks will be
appreciated above all by that section of the workers who
make up the avant-garde of the struggle for the emancipa-
tion of their class. . . . Building Utopia does not mean
simply transferring into present-day thought what has to
be achieved in the future in practice. We have to take
the workers as they are. And they are not, generally,
plunged in pauperism, as the 'Communist Manifesto' fore-
cast, nor are they without prejudices and defects as
their worshippers would have us believe. They have the
vices and the virtues natural to the social conditions in
which they live, and neither these conditions nor their
consequences can be changed overnight.
"The working class is not sufficiently mature to take political power,"
wrote Bernstein in 1899; half a century later Togliatti justified the failure
to attempt to seize power by citing the "fundamental reason that the great
problems of the nation were not mature in the great masses of the people";
these parallel declarations contain the fundamental analogy between the re-
visionism of German Social Democracy and that of the PCI. Nevertheless,
there remains a fundamental difference, that we have already mentioned:
whereas Bernstein links his assessment with a reexamination of the forecasts
contained in the "Manifesto" and the place of the working class within capi-
talist society, the PCI reaffirms the complete validity of the "Manifesto" and
the assessment of the role of the working class contained therein, from whence
is derived the implicit, ambiguous character of its revisionism.
22 Ibid., Chapter 5, "Final Aims and Movement," pp. 82-83.
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This situation may be seen clearly in the comments made by Togliatti
on the occasion of the centenary of the "Manifesto" in 1948, just at a time,
immediately after the war, when conditions of acute social conflict still
existed in Italy. Here are some of the essential passages:
It is only the Marxist doctrine that enables us to grasp
the internal logic of these hundred years of history and to
have a coherent view of them. . . . Not even the 'Manifesto'
could foresee everything that would follow the coming of
capitalism as a worldwide force of hegemony, and the spread
and progressive sharpening of the proletariat's class
struggle. It is now a discredited game they play, those
who seek in vain to falsify and heap abuse upon our doctrine
by trying to reduce it to naive prophecies of immediate up-
heaval and immediate coming of an ideal regime of justice
and liberty. Nobody has ever been, and nobody is today,
more prudent than Marxists in making forecasts about the
future, and this is precisely because Marxists--unlike
cheap idea-mongers and prophets--have a dialectical view
of reality, which means that first of all they seek to
understand reality in all its various aspects and as a
complete whole, they know how the different elements act
and react on each other, and in particular they are able
to carry out a fundamental analysis of the objective process
behind events, which can only be understood by means of dia-
lectical materialism. . . . When the 'Manifesto' was written
and published capitalism had not yet reached the apex of its
development. This makes the general conclusion it reaches
all the more important, especially when it sets up the ob-
jective of the proletariat's struggle as 'the rise of the
proletariat to be the ruling class, and the conquest of
democracy,1 that is, the conquest of political supremacy
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which the proletariat will use 'to wrest all capital gradually
from the bourgeoisie, to concentrate all the instruments of
production in the hands of the State, that is to say the pro-
letariat itself organized as the ruling class, and to increase
the total of productive forces as quickly as possible. 23
From this passage it may be seen that:
1. Only Marxism offers a "coherent view of a hundred years of history,
and only dialectical materialism gives an understanding of events.
2. Despite this, Marxists are prudent "in making forecasts about the
future."
3. The only certain conclusion is "the rise of the proletariat to be
the ruling class," and this is not, however, an immediate prospect.
Here, then, there is an explicit restatement of the principle that
Marxism and the 'Manifesto' are completely and utterly valid; however, the
practical indications to be drawn from this are extremely vague and generic.
Revisionism is only implicit, not explicit.
It is interesting to trace the development of Togliatti's reasoning
when he refers to the period that followed the Paris Commune:
For more than twenty years, first Marx and Engels, then later
Engels alone, led this activity and this struggle in one of the
periods of their life that has been studied the least, but which
contains, either fully developed or at least in nuclei, all the
principal aspects of the theoretical and political struggle
23 Manifesto del Partito communista (Manifesto of the Communist Party)
(Rome: Riuniti, 1960), introduction, pp. 20-23.
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which was to be waged by Lenin, Stalin, the Russian Bolshevik
Party, and the Third International. Of course, this period
tends to be forgotten by all the deserters and traitors to the
working class, who after making their ritual homage to the
'Manifesto' then go on to reject all its contents with the
pretext that a new historical situation has arisen and this
means that 'revision' is necessary. The document of 1848
is to be completed, by developing it--it is not to be 'revised.
. . . The experience of the legal, parliamentary, and Trade
Union activity carried out by the German Social Democrats,
the British Labor Party, and the French Socialists made it
essential, after the final breach with Bakuninist petty-
bourgeois anarchisi, to open fire against opportunism, which
is the main danger for the Socialist movement in the period
when the objective and subjective conditions for revolution
are maturing. The first documents in this struggle, in the
new conditions of the last decades of the nineteenth century,
come from the same pens as those that wrote the 'Manifesto.'
The Social Democratic traitors were forced, in order to
justify their revisionist pretenses, to falsify the famous
Preface Engels wrote to the Class Struggles in France in
1895; and to hide from the public the vigorous protests made
by the two old Masters against 'the work of shoring-up
capitalist society' to which the future German Social traitors
were already dedicating themselves. The denunciation of Social
Democracy as a party of the bourgeoisie within the working
class, and as the main support of capitalism, which was carried
out by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, is already contained, in nuclei,
in these positions.2 4
24 Ibid., pp. 214-26.
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Apart from the virulence of certain expressions such as "Social traitors"
or "deserters," which are typical of the Stalinist era (Stalin, moreover, was
explicitly called "great"), Togliatti's interpretation of events and texts
that have already been quoted here may be summarized as follows:
1. The Manifesto is to be "developed," not "revised."
2. No other explanation is given for the evolution of German Social
Democracy except that of "betrayal," which turned it into the "main support
of capitalism."
3. It is reaffirmed that the merit of Lenin (and Stalin) lies in
having restored Marx's and Engels' Marxism, and rescued it from the distortions
of the "revisionists."
As far as theory is concerned, it is important to note:
1. The "famous Preface" of Engels has already been very fully quoted;
the "revisionists" did not distort it. On the contrary, as has been said,
Bernstein himself continued to attribute to Engels a consistent view of the
subject of revolutionary violence and the dictatorship of the proletariat.
The idea that this Preface contains "in nuclei" "denunciation of Social
Democracy as a party of the bourgeoisie within the working class" is an
evident absurdity; not only did Engels speak of Social Democracy as the
authentic workers' party but even Lenin considered it as such until August
1914.
2. Marx's criticism of the Gotha Program, on the other hand, were
"hidden from the public," for reasons already perceived by Saverio Merlino.
When they published them, the German leaders were forced, in their turn, to
give an ambiguous interpretation of the "dictatorship of the proletariat."
4j.0
3. The "objective and subjective conditions of the revolution," which
were maturing in this period, refer to the Bolshevik Revolution, which Lenin
expressly linked to the Paris Commune after "decades of comparatively peaceful
capitalism between 1871 and 1914 had accumulated in the opportunist minded
Socialist parties whole Augean stables of Philistinism, imbecility, and
apostasy." 25
We thus come to one of the essential points of the type of revisionism
proper to the PCI, which is different from that of the beginning of this
century not only by virtue of its implicit nature, but also by virtue of the
fact that it is based not on the experience of a Western country (Italy)
alone, but also on Russian experience. It may be said that Togliatti, to
use his own words, "after making his ritual homage to the 'Manifesto, '" re-
jects all its contents, not by affirming that it needs to be "revised.," but
by "completing" and "developing" it in such a way that the revisionism--
since a second "ritual homage" is excluded on principle--gets carried out
surreptitiously. "The rise of the proletariat to be the ruling class"--the
most essential thesis in the Manifesto and in Marxism--is regarded as a
nonimmediate prospect which depends on the degree of evolution the masses
have attained and which is to be carried out within the framework of the
existing order, revolutionary violence and the dictatorship of the proletariat
being dependent on the attitude of the bourgeoisie. All these ideas were
drawn up by the German Social Democrats at the end of the nineteenth century.
25 "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," op. cit.,
P. 359.
41
But these views were not the result of any "betrayal," for it is im-
possible to understand why men like Bernstein or Kautsky (to name only two,)
the faithful disciples of Engels and executors of his will, should have
become "deserters." These views were the result of' a kind of social evolu-
tion which partially changed the Manifesto's perspectives and, as has been
seen, inserted the working class more and more into the context of society.
Bernstein thought that this evolution would favor the process of growing
maturity, in the sense of preparing the working class to exercise political
power on its own; in reality, the greater prosperity and the greater dignity
achieved by the working class tended to insert it all the more within the
social order, and to persuade it not to oppose existing society. What was
to seem to many the real "betrayal" (the voting of war credits on August 4,
1914) was the logical consequence and culmination of a process of which
neither Engels, nor Bernstein, nor Kautsky had foreseen all the results,
even though they might have perceived some of its premises.
The PCI has undergone an evolution of the same kind, and it is the
same process which leads it to take up some "revisionist" theses at the very
moment when it is reaffirming its Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. The PCI leaves
out of its revisionist pronouncements the fundamental fact on which they are
based, now as half a century ago, that is, the pace of events and the process
of evolution of the working class, as they were predicted by the 'Manifesto'
and by Marxism, have been disproved--to an extent which cannot be underestimated--
by the "internal logic of these hundred years of history."
The workers' and Socialist movement in Russia has undergone a different
kind of evolution: on the basis of Lenin's views (already quoted) and by means
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of the Bolshevik Party, it has enjoyed a type of experience (that is, revolu-
tionary seizure of power, setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat)
completely different from that of Western Social Democracy. This experience
seemed to be the authentic realization of revolutionary Marxism, the culmina-
tion of contemporary history, and the beginning of a new period of history,
such as Goethe saw arising on the fields of Valmy. It is the fact that it
has remained linked to this experience and all its derivations (the installa-
tion in the Soviet Union of a society which is defined as "Socialist") that
has allowed the PCI's revisionism to portray itself for a long time as the
continuation of a revolutionary tradition. In Togliatti's comments on the
centenary of the 'Manifesto' there is another remarkable logical sequnce
of ideas:
If, in 1848, Socialism ceased being a Utopia and became a
science, in 1917 the scientific prediction and distant goal of
the conquest of power on the part of the working class became
a reality, and the building and growing strength of the new
workers' state, the economic transformations begun by it and
brought to a successful conclusion, and the transformation of
the Socialist State into a great victorious world Power, have
dissipated the last trace of any kind of vague Messianism,
have replaced faith by certainty, and expectancy by fact;
before the eyes of everybody--not only the experts and the
initiated--they have integrated the dialectic of thought into
the far fuller and more convincing dialectic of the historical
reality of our times. . . . The decisive, indispensable step
forward by Marxist thought, to adapt itself entirely to the
new reality of developing capitalism, was taken by Lenin when
he formulated the doctrine of imperialism as the last stage
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of capitalism. . . . The doctrine of imperialism is inseparably
linked with that of the proletarian revolution in the imperial-
ist period, and of the leading role of the party of the working
class in this revolution. In the Leninist doctrine of imperial-
ism there is the same element of general prediction that we
found in the 'Manifesto,' and the two predictions were com-
pletely fulfilled when the working class, profiting from a
profound crisis in the bourgeois world and from the very con-
flict that divided it into two warring camps, snapped the
chain of the bourgeoisie's world domination and opened a new era,
the era of the end of this domination and of the building of a
Socialist society. Besides the doctrine of imperialism, the
arsenal of Marxism has been enriched with many other weapons.
Lenin and Stalin, at the head of the Bolshevik Party, have
developed all our doctrine, in every field, throughout three
revolutions and the great work of building Socialism. . . .
The Second World War has seen the chain of imperialism undergo
new breakages, and the forces of the proletariat, after first
recognizing and fulfilling the task of aligning themselves
in the front rank of the struggle to destroy the most reac-
tionary aspects of the imperialist bourgeois regime, have had
to fight against their old enemies in new conditions. The
people who have been capable of leading the working class and
all the avant-garde workers in these new conditions, have been
the parties which have remained faithful to the teaching of
Marx and Engels in the most scrupulous fashion, and the country
of the proletarian dictatorship. Since the Second World War,
new paths toward the acquisition of power have been opened up for
the working class in some countries, because of the help given
by the country of triumphant Socialism, but the fundamental
political teaching of Marxism has not been contradicted, ac-
cording to which the conquest of democracy for all workers and
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the transition from capitalism to Socialism demand that the
working class should become the ruling class and as such should
. 26
exercise power.
As has been seen, the fulfillment of the predictions in the "Manifesto"
--and those of Marxism in general--is deduced entirely from the revolutionary
initiative of Lenin and it seems that the doctrine of "imperialism as the
last stage of capitalism" is used to prove the "very profound crisis of the
bourgeois world" as a premise for the relatively imminent victory of Socialism
on a worldwide scale; but it is significant that all the examples taken are
based on the Soviet model, and on the seizure of power by Communists in coun-
tries other than the industrially advanced ones that were the main subjects
of Marx's and Engels' hypotheses, and the ones in which the setting up of
Socialism was supposed to take place. In fact, Togliatti's list consists of:
1. The Soviet Union.
2. The "new paths toward the acquisition of power" (that is, its con-
quest in pseudo-legal forms) in Central and Eastern Europe, where, however,
the decisive element in its "acquisition" was not the degree of social and
economic development in these countries and the activity of the working class,
but the fact that these countries were under Soviet influence and usually
controlled by Soviet troops ("the help given by the country of triumphant
Socialism.") The economically more backward countries (such as Bulgaria,
Rumania, and Poland) had this characteristic in common with more advanced
ones (Hungary or Czechoslovakia.) The main difference is in the case of
26 Manifesto del Partito communista (Manifesto of the Communist Party),
pp. 9-28.
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Czechoslovakia, in which the Communist Party seized power without the mate-
rial presence of Soviet troops, in an industrially advanced country, but in
any case having recourse to force in February 1948 without waiting for the
forthcoming election.27
Since Togliatti's comments were written in 1948, they could not have
taken into account the greatest of the "new breakages" of the "chain of
imperialism," that is, the victory of the Chinese Revolution, which was
already practically achieved in that year but was only officially recognized
the following year with the setting up of the Chinese People's Republic.
The PCI's revisionism, although already obvious immediately after the
war, was concealed behind a veil of orthodoxy because of the fact that the
Party was included among "the parties which have remained faithful to the
teaching of Marx and Engels in the most scrupulous fashion," that is, the
Russian party and the parties which had reentered the Soviet sphere of
27 It is significant that nowadays it is the PCI that emphasizes the
violent nature of the seizure of power in Czechoslovakia, whereas the leaders
of the Czech Communist Party portray the events of February 1948 as a process
of peaceful installation of Socialism. Here is how L'Unit. (April 7, 1964)
quotes a passage from Novotny's speech to the regional conference of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party at Banska Bystrica: "The secretary of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party then recalled the attacks on the policy of the
Czech Communists made recently by an article in Jen-min Jih-pao on March 30,
which tried to show that the Czechoslovak working class did not take power
in February 1948 in a peaceful manner, but by the use of violence, with the
help of the State machinery and the armed forces. These distortions resemble
very closely the ones spread around by the imperialists against the great
popular movement of February 1948 in Czechoslovakia."
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influence, whose "scrupulous faithfulness" was proved by the fact that,
unlike the Social Democrats, they had conquered power and set up Socialism,
and thus "replaced faith by certainty, expectancy by fact."
Of course, at this point we might stop to consider the question of the
character and social nature of the Soviet Union and the so-called "People's
Democracies," none of which can be called Socialist in the sense in which
Marx and Engels used the term. And it would emerge clearly that the PCI
is "revisionist" in this sense too, that in order to sustain the thesis of
the Socialist character of these countries it "revises" some of the fundamental
statements of the Marxist masters. But such a question goes beyond the scope
of this essay.
Resuming, therefore, our analysis of the ideological foundations of
the alleged Marxist orthodoxy the PCI parades, it will be seen that the main
foundation is the experience gained, on the Russian model, in countries which
are not the most advanced from an economic or industrial point of view.
This fact can be more clearly realized from an essential passage in
Togliatti's report to the Central Committee of the PCI in February 1962.
The secretary of the PCI stated:
There does not exist, in fact, any experience of the way in
which the struggle for Socialism in an advanced State
monopoly-capitalistic regime can and should be waged with
success. The German Social Democrats, faced with this
problem, simply capitulated. The British Labor Party,
after giving an initial impetus to some structural reforms,
fell back into the old empiricism. . . . The French Social-
ists opened the way to a totalitarian regime. The recent
great struggle of the Belgian workers has not been transformed
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into any coherent anti-monopolistic policy. Scandinavian
experience has no general validity. There are not even any
explicit pointers in the classics of our doctrine, except
for one very valuable one, by Lenin.
The "one" pointer of Lenin (which the reader will find in the text, and
which is very general) is, therefore, the only result of a century of Marxist
thought on how "the struggle for Socialism can and should be waged with suc-
cess in an advanced State monopoly capitalist regime," which was in fact the
regime with which Marx and Engels expressly concerned themselves. It is
quite obvious that there is an enormous difference between the language used
in the comments on the Manifesto in 1948, and the statem.nt made in 1962 that
"there are not even any explicit pointers in the classics of our doctrine."
This difference, which shows yet again how uncertain the theoretical
premises of the PCI's revisionism are, is justified only by the different
general political situation in which the PCI had to work in 1948 (the key
year of Stalinism) compared with 1962 (after the second wave of de-Staliniza-
tion at the end of 1961.) As is clear from all the texts selected here,
which cover a period of almost twnety years, political necessities are
always the dominant ones in the PCI, even when the policies and attitudes
expressed seem to be matters of ideology or of principle. In fact, as I
think I have shown, the PCI's revisionism is based on the same objective
reasons as was classical revisionism, but it has never been transformed into
any kind of awareness of these reasons, not even to the extent that this oc-
curred in the time of Bernstein.
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Even today the PCI considers Marxism, or to be more exact, Marxism-
Leninism, as a complete doctrinal corpus, which on principle can be "developed"
but has no need to be "revised." There may be problems of application, but
there are no fundamental theoretical problems which Marxism has not already
been capable of specifying and facing in the most valid possible way. But
after making this formal homage, the PCI in fact carries out an analysis and
interpretation of Marxism that profoundly alters its character, and at least
up until 1961 it was able to do this while enjoying an outside guarantee of
its orthodoxy in the endorsement of the international Communist movement and,
in particular, the CPSU.
In this situation, it will be realized why the reopening of an in-
creasingly bitter ideological debate within the Communist movement repre-
sents a particularly serious problem for the PCI. Having gone further than
any other party (more, for example, than the French) on the path of adapting
itself to the real situation in which it has to act, the PCI more than any
other party needed the guarantee which could be conferred by the most important
Communist Party in the world, and the one with the highest prestige. And it
was in exactly this way that the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU was portrayed:
this Congress, which was to open up a dramatic crisis within the entire Com-
munist movement, was portrayed by the PCI (and by Togliatti personally) as
being primarily important for its approval of the theory of the peaceful
parliamentary road to Socialism, which was explicitly enunciated by Khrushchev
and which could immediately be linked to the position assumed by the PCI since
1944.
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But the problems that the PCI refused to see had nevertheless to be
faced in reality: it is extremely significant that it is precisely the vic-
torious revolutions in backward countries--which the PCI, too, hails as a
confirmation of Marxist orthodoxy--that have given rise, via the Chinese
Communist Party, to the wave of discussion about this orthodoxy, which has
affected not only the PCI, but even the Soviet Communist Party.
The evolution of Italian Communist revisionism may be broken down into
five periods.
The first period covers the collapse of Fascism and the setting up of
a representative parliamentary regime in Italy (1944-1947), and it is in this
period that the concept of the Italian road to Socialism was formulated. It
was put forward in the report of the Secretariat to the Sixth Congress of
the Party in January 1948, in the following terms:
An important task of the Party was to acquire sufficient
ideological, political, and organizational ability to enable
it to find the Italian path to Socialism, the path laid down
by the specific traditions and conditions of our country, by
the development of democracy, and by the struggle for the im-
plementation of more advanced democratic reforms and for
Socialism. Italian democracy, because of its organic weak-
nesses and also for international reasons, could not stride
forward on the basis of the CLN, and it was the PCI, en-
lightened by the theory of Marxism-Leninism, that had to
find new paths for its development.2 9
28 Comitati di liberazione nationale (Committees of National Liberation,
interparty bodies that led the Resistance.
29 "Due anni di lotta dei communisti italiani" (Two Years of Struggle
by the Italian Communists), report on the activity of the PCI between the Fifth
and Sixth Congresses (Rome: La Stampa Moderna, 1948).
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Despite the reference to Marxism-Leninism, in this period there is no
explanation of what the relationship is between "the Italian path toward
Socialism" and the general concept outlined by Lenin in one of his fundamental
works, according to which "the forms of bourgeois States are extremely varied,
but their essence is the same: all these States, whatever their form, in the
final analysis are inevitably the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The transi-
tion from capitalism to Communism may naturally produce a tremendous abundance
and variety of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be the same:
the dictatorship of the proletariat."30 The PCI ignores this problem, it
does not specify if "the Italian path to Socialism" will bring with it
"inevitably the dictatorship of the proletariat," and to use Lenin's words,
never mentions "everything in Marxism that is unacceptable to the bourgeoisie:
the revolutionary violence of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie with a
view to its destruction."O 1
Revision of Leninism has been, therefore, a feature of the PCI since
the first period after the war, but the cultural backwardness caused by the
long period of Fascist dictatorship in Italy made it easy for the PCI to
avoid facing the theoretical problems which had convulsed the Italian workers'
movement and the Socialist Party after the First World War.
* * * * * * * * *
The second period (1947-1952) is that of triumphant Stalinism, and
runs from the phase after the setting up of the Cominform to the death of the
"State and Revolution," op. ci., p. 151.
31 "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," op. cit., p. 351.
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Georgian dictator. The "Italian path to Socialism" was partially submerged
under a wave of conformism, and at the end of this period a majority electoral
law was adopted which would have guaranteed the government a larger majority
than it was entitled to under the strict proportional system. This enabled
Pietro Secchia to take up the Leninist theme of the falsity of "bourgeois
democracy," less than a month after Stalin's death; whereas immediately after
the electoral defeat of April 18, 1948, Togliatti had assumed a reformist
tone in an article in Rinascita, and had assigned the PCI the role of a con-
stitutional opposition. This deep-seated ambiguity is characteristic of the
PCI's revisionism throughout this period.
The third period (1953-1956) may be called the period of silent de-
Stalinization, brought about by the confused debate on collective leadership
in the Soviet Union after the fall of Beria. The documents of this period
are extrem ly significant in showing not only that the PCI did not play an
important role in the first phase of de-Stalinization, but did not even take
all the measures that the Soviets were suggesting. The events of this period--
which bear, as always, the imprint of Togliatti, even if the most significant
writings come from the pen of Secchia and Edoardo D'Onofrio--show how the PCI
adopted a passive attitude and was in the rear guard with regard to facing
the problems arising after Stalin's death.
Nevertheless, it was in this period--which is characterized by a stand
still on the part of the PCI, incapable of seizing all the advantages announced
by Togliatti from its electoral victory of June 7, 1953--that the process of
revisionism took a step forward, and one completely unconnected with the
general context of de-Stalinization, on the occasion of Mauro Scoccimarro's
52
speech to the Fourth National Conference of the Party on organizational prob-
lems (January 1955). This speech is interesting because of the particular
clarity with which Scoccimarro outlined the reasons why the PCI now aims at
different objectives from those of 1921. Of course, the reasons given are
purely empirical and ignore the fundamental problems of theory concerning
Marxist doctrine, which the choice of the new objectives involves.
The fourth period is that of open de-Stalinization, between 1956 and
1960. Once again, the PCI adopted an extremely cautious, prudent attitude;
it ignored Khrushchev's secret speech and restricted itself to mentioning
the fact that the formula of the "cult of personality" seemed inadequate,
from the Marxist point of view, to explain "the errors and crimes" of the
Stalinist period. Despite this the policeman's view of history was immediately
adopted by Togliatti in his comments on the Poznan revolt, written immediately
after the Soviet criticism of his suggestions for "polycentric Communism."
Once again, as in the previous period, revisionist proposals were put
forward in an increasingly obvious way (as in the "Elements for a Policy
Declaration" already quoted), but were completely unconnected with any analy-
sis of the profound implications of de-Stalinization for the Soviet Union and
for the entire international Communist movement.
It is obvious that since "revisionism" after the Yugoslav, Polish, and
Hungarian experiences, was regarded in this period as the "principal enemy,"
the PCI too had to join in the anti-revisionist argument. Just at the time
when its interpretation of the Italian Constitution placed it, as has been
said, in the same position as the classical revisionists, the PCI brought out
a small volume written by the Party's Vice-Secretary, Luigi Longo, designed
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as a reply to the "revisionist" views maintained within the PCI by Antonio
Giolitti, who had written another book which bore the significant title of
Reforms or Revolution, taken from the title of Rosa Luxemburg's argument
against Bernstein at the beginning of the century.
It may seem ironic that the only document of a "cultural" type (that
is, not a Party document, or one drawn up for a political occasion) that the
PCI has allowed to be published in these years by any of its major leaders,
is not a defense of revisionism, but a violent attack on it. This is yet
another proof of the ambiguous, implicit character of the PCI's resumption
of the old themes of classical revisionism, a resumption dictated by adaption
to circumstances and political preoccupations, rather than by theoretical
needs.
The same elements are characteristic of the fifth and last period con-
sidered here, that of the appearance of open conflict between the CPSU and
the Chinese Communist Party (1960-1963). The PCI has never bothered to face
the theoretical, ideological problems raised by the conflict, but has always
tried merely to avoid undesirable political consequences for itself arising
from the increasingly obvious split in the international Communist movement.
Even the attitude taken by Longo (for Togliatti preferred to be absent) at
the Conference of the 81 Communist parties" does not raise any problems of
principle concerning the interpretation that the Chinese give of certain
Leninist ideas such as the role of revolutionary violence and of the dictator-
ship of the proletariat, but limits itself to criticizing the Chinese attitude
See Interventi della delegazioni del Partito Communista Italiano alla
Conferenza degli 81 Partiti communisti ed operai (Rome: A cura della Sezione
centrale di Stampa e propaganda della Direzione del PCI, 1962.)
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on the problems of war and peace; when the Chinese delegates asked ironically
what Communist Party had ever achieved power peacefully, by means of elections,
Longo replied that it was exactly the PCI that was travelling along that path.
It is superfluous to recall at this point that the PCI is not in power, but
in opposition, and collects a percentage of votes that is still below the
famous "wall of 30 p(r cent," which was an insurmountable obstacle for German
Social Democracy.
The whole attitude of the PCI in the course of the controversy has re-
peated the characteristic features already mentioned several times, namely:
1. Fidelity to the p inciples of Marxism-Leninism is repeated; but
the Chinese are not refuted when they assert that Lenin never conceived the
idea of conquering power by electoral means or of renouncing the setting up
of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
2. It is realized that the stratification of capitalist society cannot
be reduced to a mere distinction between bourgeoisie and proletariat, such
as Marx, Engels, and Lenin insisted on. But at the same time the complete
general validity of Marx', Engels', and Lenin's theses is reasserted.
These two unresolved focal points of the PCI's ambiguous revisionism
are aggravated by the fact that, as has already been mentioned, the factual
presupposition that gave them the guarantee of orthodoxy has in the meantime
been destroyed. It has been destroyed because the guarantee given by the
CPSU and by its revolutionary tradition has been made the subject of discus-
sion at the same time as the accusations of revisionism and abandonment of
the revolutionary tradition were levied against the Soviet party itself.
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In particular, the idea that it is the strength, the solidarity, and
the continuous expansion of the so-called "Socialist camp" which will paralyze
imperialism and intimidate the capitalist bourgeoisie and thus make possible
in the second half of the twentieth century what Marx considered impossible
in the second half of the nineteenth, and what Lenin thought impossible until
the day he died, namely, the conquest of power without the typical use of
violence and the setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat has been
destroyed.
The strength, the solidarity, and the continuous expansion of the
"Socialist camp" must, in fact, be looked at in a new light when the "camp"
begins to split on this very problem--the conquest of power without armed
violence.
The main anxiety of the PCI's ruling group within the last three years
has been to avoid these questions being posed in their true light. Essen-
tially aligned with Soviet positions from all points of view, the leaders of
the Party want to avoid drawing the ultimate consequences of this attitude,
not only politically, but also in theory, which is the particular subject of
this study. But the reasons why they want to avoid a theoretical debate are,
in their turn, political and not theoretical. They do not reflect the need
to remain "faithful to the teachings of Marx and Engels in the most scrupulous
fashion," given that the PCI's interpretation of this teaching presents greater
analogies with Bernstein's interpretation than with Lenin's. The reasons for
avoiding the debate are of a political kind, and express the intention of the
PCI's leaders to maintain an empirical position which will safeguard their
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authority, exercised as it is by means of authoritarian leadership of the
Party. This is put forward as "democratic centralism," but is in reality
closer to Stalin's interpretation of the phrase than to Lenin's.
* * * * * * * * *
From the political point of view, the PCI's attitude is linked to needs
that were felt even in the Stalinist period (for example, the party's cautious
attitude after the Cominform's criticisms in 1947) and immediately after
Stalin's death (note the attitude in the second half of 1954 to the question
of collective leadership,) while from the ideological point of view the
worsening Sino-Soviet conflict provided the PCI with the opportunity to
specify and outline the views that we have described. Its attitude has, of
course, been influenced by the new situation that has arisen in the interna-
tional Communist movement with the emergence of opposed views (we may refer
here to the attitude of the Polish and Rumanian parties).
This emerges quite clearly from Togliatti's report to the Central
Committee ot' the PCI in April 1964, at a particularly critical phase of the
Sino-Soviet dispute and at the time when the Party was taking a stand against
any international Communist conference designed to "excommunicate" the Chinese
Communist Party. Here is the most ideologically significant part of Togliatti's
report:
The problem to which we have devoted most of our attention,
both in studying and in trying to apply and develop the revolu-
tionary doctrines of Marxism, has undoubtedly been that of the
advance toward Socialism in countries of more highly developed
capitalism, in a democratic and peaceful fashion. We sought to
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give a correct answer to this problem immediately after the
defeat of Fascism and the conquest of the democratic regime,
aware as we were that it was our task to carry out our ac-
tivity in conditions which were profoundly different from
those in which the conquest of power was achieved in other
countries. Our Party's activity, therefore, had its own
particular stamp and its own particular objectives right
from the beginning, and they acquired full theoretical justi-
fication and more precise expression during our last three
National Congresses. This, however, is the point which is
now the subject of the greatest disagreement between us and
the positions now being defended by our Chinese comrades,
and the point which arouses the greatest virulence of
language in their arguments against us. If we reflect,
however, on the contents of their arguments, we see first
of all an obvious distortion of our views, which enables
our Chinese comrades to portray themselves as the defenders
of the elementary principles of historical and doctrinal
interpretation against us. The distortion consists in
claiming that our views consist of stating that violence
and open revolutionary splits no longer have any possibility
of taking place in the modern world, because all political
and social progress should of necessity take place in a
peaceful manner all over the world. We have never stated
anything so ridiculous. We know very well the role that
violence has always had, and still has, in history, in the
struggle of the peoples for their independence and in the
class struggle. It would be very strange if we had forgotten
this, at a time when there are still peoples who are held in
subjection to shameful Fascist regimes, by the use of violence.
. . . We in Italy have freed ourselves from Fascism by a revo-
lutionary armed struggle, nor can we keep quiet the fact that
the reactionary ruling classes are always ready to have recourse
to violence in order to prevent political and social progress or
to cancel out the gains that the working classes may have been
able to achieve. . . . After recalling all this, we must
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nevertheless add that appeals to revolutionary violence cannot
be made under any conditions, and that even more profound revo-
lutionary progress and transformations are possible even without
it. . . . The question, therefore, must be examined and cannot
be solved except on the basis of a correct assessment of the
concrete conditions of the struggle, which determine both the
objectives and the manner in which the struggle is organized
and waged. And I may perhaps be allowed to say that I think
there is something schematic and abstract in the rigid distinc-
tion between peaceful development and nonpeaceful development.
There exists a movement of the working classes and the working
masses, designed to achieve their economic and political demands,
reforms and social transformations. This movement has to act
in the way required and allowed by the situation, and its lead-
ers must be able to guide it and lead it while facing up to
changes and objective alterations in the situation, so as never
to lose control of events. Between 1943 and 1945 we fought with
weapons. If we had not then, after the victory, passed over
to legal struggle, within the democratic framework, it would
have been madness. . . . The presence and activity of a great
mass movement is essential at every moment. Any kind of
arbitrary, schematic distinction, whereby either peaceful
action is regarded as renunciation or stagnation, or else a
struggle with nonpeaceful means, if necessary, is condemned
as recklessness, is extremely dangerous. Discussion carried
out in these terms is far from being a concrete analysis of the
present situation. But this is the point where the Chinese
comrades show their inability to make even the slightest posi-
tive contribution. It appears almost that they are not in-
terested in the situations that exist at present in the coun-
tries of advanced capitalism. They have not even noticed our
great victory on last April 28. But how can they then claim
to judge our policies and our activity? To say, as they do,
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that we are reduced to opportunism of a Social Democratic
type, or that we regard the transition to Socialism as
coming about by winning half plus one of all the votes
cast in a general election, is simply another distortion.
Parliament is part of the political structure of any society
of a democratic type, and it may or may not be adequate to
represent the nation and to exercise a democratic function;
this reduces or increases its importance and the possibility
of acting there in a constructive manner, and not simply
using it as a platform for denunciation and agitation. We
today are able to act constructively in Parliament, and to
carry on the struggle of the working masses there, but we
carry on this struggle throughout the whole complex of
capitalist society's economic and political order, in order
to achieve progressive victories, and to secure reforms which
will tend to modify this order, which will make the positions
of the working classes and their organizations stronger and
more secure, and which will attack the positions of power of
the capitalist ruling classes, especially the most reaction-
ary and decisive groups of them, the groups of great monopo-
listic capital. This is, no doubt, a strategy which is
parly a new one, as it moves along the twin track of democ-
racy and Socialism. But there are conditions today which
make it both possible and necessary. A great increase in
the militancy and degree of organization of the working
masses, a widespread spirit of democracy, and an ability
to mobilize the popular masses, all of which make more
difficult any reactionary adventures on the part of the
bourgeoisie. An important shift of great masses of the
middle class, both in the towns and in the countryside,
toward positions maintained by the working class and the
struggle against great monopoly capitalism, and hence the
possibility of cooperation of a new type. Finally, a
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profound crisis in the traditional bourgeois institutions,
which forces the bourgeois ruling classes themselves to
attempt new ways of directing the economy, and which enables
us to wage a struggle for reforms and radical transformations
in this field as well. All this makes possible and necessary
the search for new ways of access to power, by means of creat-
ing a bloc of socially and politically progressive forces. .
We do not in the slightest renounce our final objectives,
which are the destruction of capitalist exploitation and the
creation of a classless society, but we desire to achieve
this through a great movement which will maintain and develop
all the positive features of the democratic institutions that
the people have conquered for themselves at the cost of such
bitter struggles and such huge sacrifices. We do not believe
it is easy to progress along this path, but it is almost a
compulsory path if we do not want to limit ourselves to
preaching revolutionary action, which nobody knows how to
bring about or how to prepare for in reality. For us, the
revolution becomes a process which is being pushed forward
even today by a whole complex of actions, involving every
field of social life. . . . None of the objections, none of
the criticisms, and none of the attacks made on us by our
Chinese comrades affect this line of action of ours in the
slightest degree or is able to challenge its validity and
effectiveness.
We may paraphrase Togliatti by pointing out that "none of the objections,
none of the criticism, and none of the attacks" made on the views expressed
by him are absent in the criticisms made of Bernstein and Social Democracy,
L'Unith, April 23, 1964.
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first by the Left wing of the Second International, and later by Lenin. It
has already been pointed out that "this strategy which is partly a new one,"
proposed by the PCI, is the strategy put forward by the gradualists in the
workers' movement at the end of the last century, when they opposed the
revolutionary interpretation of Marxism.
Where the "theoretical justification" is lacking, from a Leninist point
of view, is precisely on the decisive point: namely, the interpretation of
the process of industrial concentration and the increasing integration of
capitalist power with State power as a factor which develops democracy and
makes easier the rise of the working classes, or alternatively which hinders
the former and makes more difficult the latter. The PCI oscillates between
these two profoundly contradictory interpretations whereas Lenin, as has
clearly been seen from the preceding quotations, maintained that the second
assessment was the only valid one.
The fundamental contradiction of the PCI on this point emerges even in
the theses approved by its last Congress. The following quotations are taken
from these theses, and are reproduced in two groups: in the first, we quote
a series of propositions concerning the authoritarian characteristics and the
tendency toward centralization of power, which are considered inevitable
features of State capitalism:
The rapid development of technology and of the forces of
production that has come about . . . in Western Europe . . .
is accompanied by the spread of the system of State-monopoly
capitalism and, at the same time, by a marked tendency to a
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restriction of democratic life and of the free functioning
of the institutions of democracy.
In many countries, moreover, within the framework of
public intervention to regulate the economy, (a policy
agreed on among the great monopolistic groups and the in-
stitutions of State capitalism), a tendency to induce the
Trade Unions to accept prearranged wage levels is becoming
increasingly important. It is to this economic situation
that the tendency toward limitation of democratic rights,
toward a crisis in the institutions of democracy, and
toward a diminution of the democratic life of the popular
masses, corresponds.
This development of State capitalism, together with
monopolistic expansion, puts its decisive imprint on the
present economic regime, and makes it a characteristic
kind of State monopoly capitalism. The expansion and
domination of great monopolistic capital is a conse-
quence and an example of the laws of capitalist develop-
ment and of imperialism in the present phase, as revealed
by Marxist and Leninist analysis (that is, a tendency to
concentration and international integration, and aggrava-
tion of the direct exploitation of the proletariat and of
the indirect exploitation of the whole of society.)
These propositions, which hark back to a Leninist interpretation of
the phenomenon, are set off and opposed by others, in which State capitalism
appears as the expression not of any strengthening of monopolies, but as the
Tesi peril x Congresso del PCI (Rome: Cronograph, 1962), pp. 8-9.
" Ibid., pp. 10-11.
Ibid., p. 27.
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expression of a crisis within the monopolies, and represents the first steps
in progress toward Socialism. Here are some examples, which should be com-
pared with the previous quotations:
The transition to State capitalism is an index of the
general crisis of capitalism. It is the proof of the fact
that the capitalist system is no longer capable--without
State intervention--of facing the problems of increased
production and the problems set by the progress of a mass
movement. . . . It is in order to overcome the difficulties
and contradictions created by this situation that the
bourgeois ruling groups themselves are demanding and accept-
ing State intervention in economic life.37
Any planning model that tends . . . to block the path of
any further increase in State owned property or of any
further extension of State capitalism, is to be rejected."8
The ever increasing extension of the system of State
monopoly capitalism signifies the objective ripening of the
conditions for the transition to Socialism. . . . The move-
ment aiming at increasing the State's direct intervention in
economic affairs . . . must be encouraged on conditions that
it is always accompanied by a powerful democratic struggle
demanding that State intervention in economic affairs should
favor the interests of the great working masses and that there
should be public control over all sectors of the economy that
are run by the State. . . . A very important role in all this
may be played by Parliamentary institutions."
Ibid., pp. 28-29.
38 Ibid., p. 50.
Ibid., pp. 16-17.
(DIt
In order to evaluate the specific characteristics of the
expansion of State intervention in the economy in our country
. . . we must, moreover, bear in mind the original
features of an advanced democratic type ratified by the
Republican Constitution. Popular democratic forces maintain
political positions, even positions of power, in this State,
and this allows them to accept fully and defend the constitu-
tional pact and at the same time to fight against the class
nature and the class aims of this State, by acting . . . to
push it along the path of progressive democracy, which is
capable of developing toward Socialism.40
It has already been seen what the characteristic features of the Italian
Constitution are; to say that in this type of State it is possible "to fight 4
against the class nature and the class aims of this State," to the extent of
using "the State's direct intervention in economic affairs" in order to
overthrow the aims of the great industrial complexes, means to alter the
entire assessment of the relationships between structure and superstructure,
between economic and political authority, and between the capitalist class
and the legal-State institutions, made by Lenin in the works already quoted.
* * * * * * * * *
This is the point which Communist revisionism has reached in Italy.
We have seen the remarkable analogies and the important differences between
it and the revisionism that arose more than half a century ago in German
Social Democracy and within the Second International.
IIbid., p. 30.
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The fundamental analogy is dictated by objective conditions that have
ripened in Western industrial society, that is, the difference between the
pace and manner of this society's real development (and hence the real
development of the working class within the society) and some of Marx's
predictions. The necessity of adapting political behavior to a real situa-
tion which is at least partly different from what was predicted is at the
root of the analogies between the two revisionisms, inasmuch as they are a
product of the workers' movement in Western society.
The essential difference between them is also dictated by objective
conditions, but by objective conditions that have ripened outside Western
society, that is, in the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc; it is because
the PCI remains linked to the official ideology of these countries, which
rule the international Communist movement, that it has not been able to
develop and carry to their logical conclusion the premises contained in its
revisionist attitude, which is dictated by its Western situation. Anchored
to the official ideology (portrayed as a Marxist-Leninist one) of the Com-
munist ruling class in the Soviet Union and the other countries where com-
munism is in power, the PCI's revisionism has remained implicit, in the
sense that has been explained several times in this essay. It contains
elements of the two main tendencies in which Marxist thought has so far been
expressed, that is, of both the gradualist and the revolutionary interpreta-
tions of Marxism. The difficulty of reconciling both these interpretations
in a coherent way is responsible for the empirical, confused, and contra-
dictory nature of the PCI's revisionism.
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The culmination of the process, summarized in the "Theses" of the
Tenth Congress, does contain some new elements, however: the complex of
contradictions tends to merge into what has always been a focal point in
Marxist discussion, namely, the role of the State and its relations with the
economy. In the attempt to resolve the contradictions mentioned above,
relatively new ideological elements are making progress within the PCI,
elements that show the influence of the Western social and economic reality
within which the Party has to work, and also of the Soviet ideological com-
ponents to which it remains linked. These influences may be provisionally
summarized as being "technocratic."
Technocratic tendencies are present both in Western and Eastern indus-
trial society; the attempts at interpreting the relationships between the
State, the great industrial concentrations (both public and p ivate) of an
oligopolistic type, political power, and the political representatives of
the working class, which are emerging ever more clearly within the PCI as a
consequence of this real situation, may lead to a new interpretation of
Marxism. After the revolutionary interpretation and the gradualist interpre-
tation, we may see a technocratic interpretation, or to be more precise, a
bureacratic-technocratic interpretation. In the effort to reconcile two
different kinds of experience by averaging out what they have in common, the
PCI's revisionism may be transformed into an authoritarian and bureaucratic
interpretation of a hypothetical development toward Socialism, an interpreta-
tion merging the bureau-technocratical characteristics of Western societies
and the ideological-authoritarian characteristics of the Soviet Union and the
countries under Communist rule.
